Raymond Aron 1 Je schärfer aber die Bedeutsamkeit einer Kulturerscheinung zum klaren Bewußtsein gebracht werden soll, desto unabweislicher wird das Bedürfnis, mit klaren und nicht nur partikulär, sondern allseitig bestimmten Begriffen zu arbeiten.
Max Weber 2
This chapter develops a constructivist-institutionalist model of national interest formation and foreign policy formulation. Focusing on variable constellations between the logic of institutionalization and construction at the interstate level on the one hand and domestic factors on the other, this model offers a number of general hypotheses about the potential, contingent, and uneven impact of institutionalized interstate relations on states' interests and policies. The chapter first distinguishes among three main components of interstate institutionalization and construction: regularized intergovernmentalism, predominantly symbolic acts and practices, and parapublic underpinnings of interstate relations. Institutionalized relations between states, thus conceived, are sets of regularized intergovernmental interactions that include elements of shared meanings and social purpose. Proper conceptualization allows us to empirically capture the distinctive effects that such interstate institutionalization and construction may generate. It also enables us to connect interstate relations thus conceived to other presumed factors of state interests and foreign policy, notably from domestic politics. Thereby, this chapter generates a total of six empirically testable propositions regarding the potential and variable impact of interstate institutionalization on national interests and policymaking. This book's theoretical explorations thus consider interstate institutionalization and construction, domestic construction, and domestic political structures broadly as separate sources of national interest and foreign policy, treating them conceptually separately. Depending on different constellations between interstate logic, the domestic constructions of one or both of the states involved, or their domestic structures broadly, this chapter's model hypothesizes, the impact of an interstate relationship on the national interests and policies of the states involved may be strong, moderate, or absent. Three contrasting views drawn from the most established general theoretical perspectives in international relations theory offer potentially competing approaches to the origins of national interests and foreign policies and to how interstate institutionalization may or may not affect state goals and policymaking.
Institutionalization and Construction Between States
Empirically examining and analytically capturing the causal implications of the relations between states first requires careful conceptualization of what it is that makes up such relationships. In so doing, I distinguish among three building blocks or categories of interaction that together constitute interstate institutionalization and construction: regularized intergovernmentalism; largely symbolic acts and practices; These summit meetings grew quickly and massively after the Treaty's conclusion in 1963, expanding to include more ministers and increasingly larger delegations from the two states' ministerial bureaucracies. By the 1980s, the "summits" comprised all major foreign and security as well as domestic policy areas, often stretching across all levels of governmental and administrative hierarchies. Furthermore, through the addition of a number of protocols to the Treaty, France and Germany further increased the frequency and intensity of their bilateral regularized intergovernmentalism. Following the 1982 creation of the Franco-German Security and Defense Commission, for example, in 1988 they instituted the Franco-German Defense and Security Council that further bound together the two states in these policy areas.
In order to prevent political misunderstandings, exchange opinions and background information, and bind yet closer especially policy-and decision-making proceedings, in
2001 France and Germany decided to increase the frequency of consultations on the highest political levels. Named after the Alsatian town in which the scheme was conceived, the "Blaesheim process" meant that the two states' foreign ministers or heads of state and government would hold informal and discreet talks every six to eight weeks. Since 2003, following the fortieth anniversary of the Elysée Treaty's conclusion, the semiannual Franco-German meetings took on the title "joint Ministerial Councils." Yet again expanded, they now include the two governments' entire cabinets as well as delegations from all or almost all of the two states' ministerial bureaucracies.
The Franco-German regularized intergovernmentalism has developed a dynamic of its own, contributing significantly to the establishment of a particular kind of institutional fabric between these states. For almost half a century since its inception, this robust bilateral intergovernmentalism has helped to keep France and Germany hanging together in spite of a wide range of forces that might have promoted drift or rift. Potential domestic factors of rupture or instability have included, among others, changes of governments, presidents, prime ministers, chancellors, or other key personnel on one or both sides of the Rhine; the "chemistry" among French and German political leaders and the personal proclivities of the individuals in key positions in the French and German states; ideological differences among the political parties in power in Bonn or Berlin and Paris; changing and diverse coalition governments in Germany; and the rise of cohabitation in France. 5 And potentially disruptive international factors have prominently included the end of the Cold War, the rise (and apparent decline) of American unipolarity, German unification, various rounds of European Union enlargement, and expanding and intensifying globalization.
Navigating through times of such significant internal change and external transformations has not been without bouts of friction or crises between the two states. But France-Germany did not break. The regularization of their intergovernmentalism has helped them to hang together for almost half a century in a particular way that survived the great 1989 divide in Europe, and that has proven both resilient and adaptable during the frequently turbulent years of the post-Cold War era and early twenty-first-century world politics. During these decades of internal and external change, Franco-German bilateral intergovernmentalism has standardized FrancoGerman intergovernmental affairs, created routines, and outlined normal ways of handling things; it has bound together and, over time, helped to socialize cohorts of diplomatic and other governmental personnel; and, in a variety of ways, it has generated and perpetuated social meaning.
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The fabric and patterns of this bilateral intergovernmentalism with its manifold communication channels and regularized contacts have lastingly connected heads of states and governments, ministers, and ministries from both countries and compelled them to streamline and coordinate their policy-and decision-making schedules.
In particular, the semiannual summit meetings, with the preparations preceding and the agenda following them, have engendered their own rhythms. They have often taken on difficult issues not satisfactorily resolved on lower hierarchical levels, or set agendas for issues to be dealt with and resolved in the future. Frequently, they set up working groups with specific tasks to report back to the high and highest bilateral levels in a subsequent summit. Thus, even if only tenuously, they have intertwined processes of French and German national interest formation and policymaking. At the core of this bilateral regularized intergovernmentalism, "the Franco-German Treaty," noted long-time French Minister of Foreign Affairs and Prime Minister de Murville at the Treaty's twentieth anniversary, "has over time … become an essential part of the life of our peoples"-"a basic element of the foreign policies of our two countries." 7 The
Franco-German regularized intergovernmentalism has become part of a bilateral polity that helped to define a particular international regional system. adversaries or enemies. They legitimize some goals and actions and delegitimize others. Symbolic acts and practices construct social meaning and purpose well beyond the immediate ends of the short term. Such meaning and purpose cannot be reduced to other types of international activity or aspects of institutionalized interstate relations, such as regularized intergovernmentalism or others. They help to shape the stage on which much of daily politics unfolds.
The dominant Franco-German post-war meaning originates in a string of symbolic acts between 1958 and 1963. During this period, in a series of often stirring gestures, ceremonies, and speeches, French President Charles de Gaulle and German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer generated and instituted new, transformed meaning and social purpose for an incipient era of Franco-German affiliation and proximity. These symbolic acts included their demonstrative private meetings, joint travels through the two countries, participation in the first joint parade of Franco-German troops, kneeling and praying next to each other in Reims, a list of speeches, and their hug and fraternal kiss after the signing of the Elysée Treaty.
A host of chiefly symbolic acts and practices has since reproduced, perpetuated, and corroborated the meaning and purpose of the Franco-German relationship that these two men instituted. Some of these practices are more or less regularized and recurrent, with dates marked on the calendar. Among many others, they have included the July 14, 1994 , and President Chirac's reception as the first foreigner to speak before the German Bundestag after the German parliament had returned to Berlin postunification. As single events, these are meaningful integral threads of an overall fabric.
Singular, they are part of a whole. 9 The dominant Franco-German purpose of the past five decades has its characteristic normative justifications or explanations in the two countries' political discourses. For the most part, the appeals are historical, referring to the necessity to overcome a long history of anguish and suffering; allude to cultural affinity; or hint at the FrancoGerman role in providing stability or consolidation in European affairs. In the FrancoGerman example, symbolic acts endow this bilateral relationship with specific meaning and specific purpose. They help to institutionalize Franco-German relations as a value and, often, as an end in themselves. The public funding or organization of international parapublic activity comes with the institutionalization of social purpose. For example, the Franco-German television channel ARTE presents world news and even weather from a "Franco-German" perspective. Publicly funded or publicly organized youth activities across borders virtually always embody social purpose. Parapublic underpinnings of interstate relations are normatively charged. They are not neutral or value free. Accordingly, those between France and Germany have helped to define a particular Franco-German meaning and social purpose.
Parapublic practices have at least three specific kinds of partially overlapping effects, which together construct international social purpose: First, they provide a great variety of resources for joint undertakings most broadly conceived. Second, through transpolity educational and training programs that are frequently part of the parapublic weave, they socialize their participants, thus cultivating a certain kind of personnel to later practice international affairs by staffing public (and private) offices. Thus parapublic institutionalization helps to produce and re-produce personnel immersed in the frame of value, signification, and social purpose of the particular interstate relationship that they underpin. A variety of additional parapublic elements, including publicly supported mass media institutions and a multitude of prizes accorded for advancing Franco-German matters, complement these three main staples.
In their entirety, these parapublic interactions compose distinct historical formations. They are part of a bilateral institutional order. They have undergirded the "special" relationship between France and Germany over the past half century and have helped to endow it with a particular value, meaning, and purpose.
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Institutional Logics
Thus conceived, institutionalized relations between states are sets of regularized interaction, meaning, and social purpose. They may imply elements of interstate and (as in the case of parapublic connections) transpolity institutionalization and construction. Their institutionalization of patterns of interaction and meaning gives them their historical significance and political relevance. Relations change when interaction patterns and the meaning that they incorporate are reproduced differently over time. A fundamental change of their interactions and meaning will transform them. Rupture will terminate them.
Each of the components of institutionalized interstate relations-regularized intergovernmentalism, symbolic acts and practices, and parapublic underpinningscontributes distinct aspects to the relationship between states. Each may exert separate influences on the states involved. However, this book explores the total impact of interstate institutionalization and construction on national interests and foreign policy, looking at the combined influence of these relations between states. Thus chapters 3-6 scrutinize the overall effects of the particular relations between France and Germany rather than testing for the separate causal effects of the single components that together make up the relationship. 12 In combination, the components of interstate institutionalization and construction generate a variety of general effects:
(1) Institutionalized relations standardize conduct. They pre-structure proceedings and help to shape normalities and normal expectations. (2) They generate and perpetuate social meanings and purpose. Thereby they legitimize and make intuitive some courses of action, delegitimize and make implausible others. They also provide reasons to want and to do some things, and not to do others-alone or with others. (3) They may engender rudiments of collective identity or co-define otherness. By doing so, in a broad sense, they help to stabilize order in international affairs-not understood as the absence of conflict but as regularization. These political effects and causal implications may overlap and are not necessarily mutually exclusive. Historically rooted domestic constructions are internally shared views and understandings regarding the proper and suitable role and purpose of one's own state as a social collectivity in the international arena. Here, they refer specifically to selfviews of a country's proper place and role in the world, including foreign and security policy. They are products of history, memory, and interpretation. They may be broken down into a few core components, centrally defining such self-views and their implications. They typically come with characteristic vocabulary that both reflects and substantiates these core elements of domestic construction. Their main historical reference points are rooted in national historical experiences. Such domestic role constructions cannot be reduced to the interests or ideologies of dominant groups, parties, or single persons in or near power, or to organizational features of state and society. Nor is such domestic construction merely the sum or the overlapping consensus of individual or group interests. As an analytic concept, historically rooted domestic construction encapsulates "what we want and what we do as a result of who we think we are, want to be, and should be," in light of national historical experiences and dominant interpretations of their meaning. As internal reference systems, such domestic constructions affect national interests and foreign policies.
14 At a minimum, these historically rooted domestic constructions are shared among the national political and administrative elites, across a variety of publicly organizational units of the state, and among the relevant foreign policy community, which includes advisors and researchers as well as academic and journalistic commentators and observers. A strong elite consensus and wider public appreciation of the core elements of such domestic construction will increase the concept's analytic leverage.
Such domestic role constructions are internally anchored historical creations. They may be contested, but they tend to endure. They are neither invariably fixed nor necessarily immutable across time. They appear, develop, and become dominant during one period of time; change, decay, or recede into history during another. Yet, neither are they purely transient phenomena. Often they display astounding temporal tenacity. As factors of interest and policy, they can be captured by empirically extracting their core elements and the characteristic set of prevailing vocabulary at a given time and place. 15 Domestic constructions of self and proper role and purpose in the international arena are a major source of influence on what state governments define as national interests and cast into policy. 16 Their varying causal effects on national interests and policy may complement the effects of other sources of national interests (such as interstate institutionalization and construction, or the impact of domestic interest groups), or they may be in various degrees of tension with them. Domestic constructions affect national interests and foreign policies in different ways: They both prescribe and proscribe. They prescribe in that they induce interests and policies. They may motivate certain wills, goals, and actions, and they may make plausible and intuitive certain objectives but not others. Yet domestic constructions also proscribe in that they rule out or subdue options. They make some interests and policy options intuitively implausible, categorically exclude them as wrong or unacceptable, or make them unthinkable by putting them outside realistic consideration. 17 Frequently, interests and policies that derive from historically rooted domestic construction are viewed as normal, right, and intuitively plausible and appropriate within the respective country. The first core element of the German self-cultivated self-view encompasses the propensity that it befits Germany to promote and consolidate an increasingly precise legal framing of international affairs; to support broadening the legitimacy of the international order; and generally to advance the international rule of law, legally codified procedures, and regularized conduct. 19 Substantively and processually, this component encourages formulating one's wants and policies in conformity with already existing international rules. It promotes the advancement, deepening, and consolidation of international law and rule as a general policy goal in itself. It also channels interests toward specific international policy issue areas such as human rights and the environment.
"Never-On-Our-Own"
A second main German domestic construction component comprises a general dislike for "going alone" or "doing it alone": unilateralism as unsuitable for oneself, especially in security affairs. 
Military Force as Last Resort Toward Non-Selfish Ends
The third German role element incorporates great skepticism and a very restrictive attitude toward the use of force. The self-view consensus strongly embraces nonmilitary instruments as both normal and fundamentally preferable for achieving one's goals. 21 A peculiar mix of ends, functions, and implementation characterizes Germany's acceptance of the potential use of military power only as a last resort. Self-defense aside, the ends cannot be narrowly national-selfish, and a broad international consensus must justify them. The function of force is to (re)channel conflict into nonmilitary forms as quickly as possible. Its implementation must be legitimized by broadly supported international decisions and realized by a broad international coalition, ideally under the aegis of an international organization. establish that Germany, "due to its history," has a "special (co-)responsibility," or that Germany must be a predictable partner in the quest for regional and global stability. Frequently, role and purpose terms come as compounds or in combinations -"responsibility politics/policies" (Verantwortungspolitik) or Germany as a "reliable friend and partner as anchor for stability and peace." 22 During the period covered here, Germany's domestic construction discourse was characteristic and bounded.
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The substance of France's domestic construction elements differs in kind from
Germany's, with vocabulary and notions mirroring these differences. Similarly, the historical roots of constructions of France's proper role in the world differ radically.
Independence
This chief French role-component implies a view of self as standing alone, able to act in as many foreign policy fields as possible "on one's own terms and without endangering a dependent relationship with any other country." This role element encompasses territorial splinters that matters but the role conception to which they contribute. "The French continue to produce their history as the accomplishment of a universal mission."
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France's domestic construction terminology, too, relates intimately to a historically shaped and domestically anchored conception of self in international affairs. Yet it diverges sharply from Germany's. It is the vocabulary of another normality. Standard French role terms include "greatness," "rank," and "glory" (grandeur, rang, gloire), and a few related terms like "dignity," "prestige," and "pride." Grandeur is perhaps the key term denoting historically shaped French self-views. 33 The notion of rang typically comes in such formulations as: France has to "take its rank," live up to its rank, or "keep its rank"; France must occupy "a place in the front rank," "its traditional place in Europe and the world as a nation"; the "impossibility of being satisfied with a second role for France." 34 In a passage that became part of a national canon, de Gaulle delineates a conceptual abstract that is in its own way a condensation of a national selfcategorization and role: "France cannot really be herself but in the first rank…. France cannot be France without greatness." Crucial elements of proper national role and purpose in the world evolve domestically, in relation to or against one's own collective past and interpretations of its meaning and implications. The emergence and consolidation of such historically rooted construction seems to involve three key components: a broad and typically amorphous set of historical raw materials; a selective focus on a number of central historical reference points; and some dominant, more or less widely shared interpretations of the meaning and political implications of these reference points for one's role and purpose in the international arena. The histories of France and Germany surely provided the two countries with quite different assortments of historical raw materials after World War II. And indeed, the French and the Germans chose markedly dissimilar historical reference points, which they endowed with distinct meanings and political significance, and to which they referred when thinking about themselves and their foreign policy roles. After the dust of the war had settled, by the late 1950s, their respective historical reference points had fully crystallized and the key meanings and implications they associated with them had consolidated.
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In the German case, the historical legacies of World War II and the Holocaust, with the conception of a democratic Germany as a counterdesign to the barbaric Third Reich regime, are constitutive. 37 Dominant interpretations of the meaning and implications of "no more war" and "never again Holocaust" are at the core of Germany's historically shaped domestic constructions of the country's proper international role and foreign policy in the post-war decades. It may be trivial to state that two disastrous world wars, the moral devastation of the Holocaust, scorched earth, mass slaughtering, and miles of barbed wire have left their traces on Germany's collective psyche in the decades to follow. It is also true. Hypotheses 1-3
Whether and how strongly interstate institutionalization and construction will affect state interests and policies in specific political contexts or situations, we may now hypothesize, will depend on constellations between the effects of institutionalized interstate relations and those of historically rooted domestic construction. One can think of three basic constellations between these two sets of effects: There can be no conflict between them; there can be tension; and they can directly clash. If there is no conflict, the effects from these two sources will be additive. Unencumbered by the influence of domestic construction, in this constellation the effects of institutionalized relations should be strong. This is the first hypothesis that I derive from the model.
The stronger the tension between the effects of externally institutionalized relations and internal domestic construction becomes, the weaker I expect the impact of institutionalized relations on interests and policies to be. To be sure, in a bilateral relationship, for example, tension may stem from the domestic construction of either one or both of the states involved and the logic of their institutionalized relationship (the hypothesis here is not about possible tensions between the two countries' domestic constructions themselves). In the Franco-German case, for example, for very different reasons, either domestic construction (or both) may not fit together well with the logic of their institutionalized bilateral relationship. The second hypothesis that I suggest thus holds that if the effects of institutionalized relations and domestic construction are in tension, the impact of the institutionalized relationship will be weaker. Institutionalized relations might still be effective; but their effects will be encumbered. This is the third hypothesis: If the effects on national interests and foreign policies induced by institutionalized relations directly clash with effects originating from core components of domestic construction, then the impact of interstate institutionalization and construction on national interests and foreign policies will decline. In this constellation, I hypothesize, domestic construction effects will generally be preponderant, trumping the interstate institutionalization effects. The latter effects will be feeble or recede.
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Thus viewed, depending on the constellation, domestic construction may function as facilitator (or permittor), inhibitor, or overrider of the effects of institutionalized interstate relations. The degree of political authority (or power) centralization determines the hierarchic level at which interests are authoritatively defined, policies fixed, and decisions taken for the entire social collectivity in a given political system. The higher the hierarchic level at which this takes place, and the less consideration that must be given to the voices or demands of other public entities of equal or subsidiary rank, the more centralized the organization of a political system. Political authority centralization decreases as single governmental or state entities (staatliche Teileinheiten)-such as military leaderships, parliamentary committees, or sub-federal territorial units like régions or Länder-become more important with their respective "particularistic interests" in the overall formation of interests and policies.
The strength or weakness of a coalition government composed of two or more partieswhether government is streamlined or, for example, cohabitation-divided, or whether executive and legislative branches of government competitively check and balance each other with fragmentary effects and authority dispersion-also contributes to the degree of authority centralization in a system. The more units contributing to the formulation of positions, the more political authority or power is dispersed in the system. Fragmentation and dispersion are not only the result of the number of entities participating in or constructively co-formulating interests and policies. They also relate to the number of government or state entities that can block or veto such decisions. Thus, high degrees of authority centralization can also mean few "veto points" to block or undermine state or governmental position fixation and policy formulation. 43 Degrees of authority centralization help to determine the difficulty of arriving at positions and policies and the number of different entities of state governments that contribute to the formulation of interests and policies, as well as how many entities are capable of "vetoing" positions or policies.
A high degree of state autonomy means that a government may develop and fix interests and policies with little or no influence from the particularistic interests of domestic or transnational organized society. The easier the access of organized society to the political power centers where public positions are authoritatively fixed, and the greater the influence of certain groups on what the government or administration adopts in a given policy issue area and time, the lower the degree of state autonomy. State autonomy shapes the role and influence of organized domestic or transnational society in determining national interests and foreign policies. It conditions whether, where, and how organized society can access the political process that brings about interests and policies. Degrees of political authority centralization, along with degrees of state autonomy from society's influence and pressure, together define "state strength." High degrees of authority centralization and state autonomy give rise to high degrees of state strength. In a strong state, governments define interests on a high level of centralization with a high degree of autonomy from society. In reverse, fragmentation or dissipation of political authority among state and governmental entities and little autonomy from the influence of private societal interests mean low degrees of state strength.
France and Germany
Overall, during the time period relevant for this study, the French state is stronger than the German state: It is more centralized and has, in many policy domains, more autonomy from its society. However, degrees of centralization and autonomy vary significantly across policy domains and contexts for both France and Germany.
Labeled "monarchie républicaine" 44 and "the institutionalization of leadership," 45 Fifth
Republic France has frequently been cited as close to the ideal type of a strong state: a system with a strong president and a government and administration highly centralized in many fields. 46 During much of the Fifth Republic, the French state has enjoyed high degrees of autonomy from organized society in many policy domains-sometimes actively taking control of aspects of French society. For example, the state has controlled economic activity in many industrial sectors. In many areas of production, far into the 1990s, the French state has cultivated one or two national champions that it has owned or controlled in various legal forms. In industrial areas of concern to national security, not only has the state been autonomous from industry, but it has more or less run it. Both centralization of political authority and state autonomy are very high in arenas such as foreign affairs and defense, even in times of cohabitation.
However, with the arrival of cohabitation, political authority has, in a number of policy areas, been split among president, prime minister, and government. In sectors such as agriculture, education, and transport, the French state has proven quite vulnerable to the pressures of a sometimes seemingly anarchic society. Features that determine the strength of the French state in a particular policy area and time period include whether or not France is cohabitation-ruled, and if so how the respective policy area is divided among president, prime minister, and government; how much influence the national assembly can exert; how much impact the French régions have; and how much pressure society is able to mobilize.
In democratic Germany, as a counterdesign to the Führerstaat of the Third Reich, political authority has generally been decentralized. This includes horizontal features of decentralization as well as vertical ones among federal and Länder levels. At the federal level, the executive branch of government shares political power with an influential judiciary branch, including a fully independent and often very influential supreme court. Political authority of the federal executive is intricately intertwined with a comparatively powerful Bundestag as federal legislature. Within the federal executive, single ministries frequently enjoy considerable independence from the chancellor and his or her office. This is often pronounced, because at the federal level Germany is typically ruled by coalition governments composed of different parties. Federal coalitions, in turn, must work out positions and policies with Länder governments of various partisan compositions in many policy areas. For good reasons, Germany has been described as "the grand coalition state." 47 In addition, and with further authority-decentralizing effects, numerous public tasks performed by the state in other systems have been transferred to domestic "parapublic institutions." 48 The autonomy of the German state is constricted in many policy domains by an efficiently organized society. 49 However, in some policy areas-notably foreign relations and defense-political authority is much more centralized at the federal level than in others (e.g., education). In several domains, again including those having to do with foreign affairs, the German state also enjoys comparatively higher levels of autonomy. In these policy areas, centralization of political authority may be high when a strong chancellor is in charge of his coalition and in control of his party, with a sufficient majority in the Bundestag and its committees. This situation, in combination with elevated degrees of state autonomy, can lead to high degrees of state strength regarding the "political willbuilding process (politischer Willensbildungsprozess)." Other features affecting degree of political authority centralization and state autonomy include the allocation of authority among federal and sub-federal levels; the number of ministries involved; the relations among those ministries; the role of the chancellor's office; the distribution of power within the respective coalition government (the strength of the chancellor and the majorities in the Bundestag and its committees); the strength of domestic parapublic institutions; and the organizational mode of societal interests and their access to the power centers.
PRINTED Hypotheses 4-6
Connecting interstate institutionalization and construction with features of the domestic institutional structures of the states involved generates three more testable propositions to answer the questions presented here. It appears plausible that variable constellations between "state strength"-the degree of authority centralization in the political system and state autonomy from organized society-and institutionalized interstate relations help to determine whether and how strongly the latter affects interests and policies. Generally, I expect that the higher the degrees of authority centralization and state autonomy, the more likely it is that institutionalized relations will have powerful influence.
The fourth hypothesis proposes that high degrees of both authority centralization and state autonomy are most conducive to institutionalized relations taking effect upon national interests and foreign policies. High degrees of state strength will increase the likelihood that institutionalized relations will matter. In this constellation, domestic structures are an underlying permissive cause, allowing institutionalized external relations to become most effective. The fewer governmental or state entities with the power either to influence or to block potential effects of external relations, the more likely it is that the latter will have influence. The fewer veto points, the less likely it is that potential effects of institutionalized external relations will get "swallowed," or vetoed, from within the polity. In other words, fewer domestic cooks make it more likely that the pot will be (at least partially) internationally prepared. Institutionalized external relations may still have effects upon interests and policies even in the presence of veto points, if the institutionalized external relations' effects do not collide with the goals of those entities with veto power, perhaps under the influence of societal pressure. But if there are fewer veto points, the veto likelihood is lower.
Fifth, I hypothesize that "medium" degrees of state strength will tend to negatively affect the relevance of institutionalized external interstate relations. Fragmentation and dissipation of authority in the domestic system and lower levels of state autonomy will generally undermine their potential effects. If state strength is declining, either because authority centralization or state autonomy or both are decreasing, the "particularistic interests" of single governmental units (such as military leaderships, parliamentary committees, or sub-federal territorial units) or the particularistic interests of organized society will become more relevant for the substantive formation of the national interest or policy in a given policy area and time period. That shift, in turn, will increase the likelihood of incompatibilities or frictions with effects on interests and policies as induced by institutionalized external relations. Lower degrees of autonomy might not necessarily oppose the effects of institutionalized relations, if domestic societal interests happen to pull in the same causal direction as their state's institutionalized relations with other states. But the likelihood that subsidiary governmental entities and particularistic societal interests can undermine will increase.
PRINTED The sixth and last hypothesis holds that decentralization and dissipation of political authority in the system, as well as low state autonomy, will undermine the relevance of institutionalized relations as a factor of national interest and policy. The weaker the state, the more domestic societal interests and "particularistic interests" of single, often subsidiary governmental entities will affect interests and policies.
Consequently and concomitantly, in this constellation the interaction and meaning of interstate institutionalization and construction will matter the least. 
Other Perspectives and Competing Views
This section presents three theoretical perspectives that contrast with the constructivist-institutionalist explanation developed so far. Each of these views offers a different position on the origins of national interests and foreign policies, implying different answers to explain the varying impact of interstate institutionalization on interests and policies. I focus on three of the most established perspectives in international relations: realism (which I present in two versions with slightly different yet compatible emphases); neoliberal institutionalism (stressing efficiency yet sharing several assumptions with neorealism); and a society-rooted domestic politics version of liberalism. These general international relations perspectives differ significantly in their intellectual core tenets and main assumptions as well as on most of these issues that this study raises. Each of them offers a distinct view of the particular historical context that situates this book's empirical inquiries, and each entails empirically identifiable implications in specific political contexts and situations. On the one hand, the factors and forces emphasized by each perspective-together with those put forth by the constructivist-institutionalist model-may be complementary in achieving the fullest explanation possible of the processes and outcomes that chapters 3-6 scrutinize.
On the other hand, these perspectives as well as the constructivist-institutionalist view may be competitive in their relative merit in explaining these outcomes and in Realism Realist views on the origins of national interests closely intertwine with central realist tenets on the nature of international affairs and the defining features of the international condition. Realists stress the importance and underlying implications of formal anarchy of the international system-that is, the absence of regional or world governmental structures with credible means of enforcement beyond the state, making the international system a self-help system. States, frequently presumed unitary and instrumentally rational in realist thinking, are the key actors in world politics. They seek security and influence. The global or regional distribution of power and threatincluding the capacity to harm or influence others-are the key historical variable features driving world politics. Core national interests derive from the enduring and variable features of the external security context thus defined. States desire to safeguard their security, political independence, and decision-making autonomy, and to defend their overall position in the system; armament policies tie in closely to these objectives. States arm in response to security pressures, power imbalances, and military threats. They arm in order to secure their capacity to defend their territorial integrity, their national independence, and their political autonomy.
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Political realism is no uniform theoretical monolith but comprises various currents and versions. How much emphasis is put on structural imperatives and how much room there may be for other sources of national interests will depend on the specific version of realism and the historical context. 51 However, the characterization above formulates an overlap among the major contemporary versions of realism on the key sources of national interests as bases for policy. In this book's historical investigations in chapters 3-6, I usually focus on the strategic-security orientation of realism that dwells on external security contexts and security pressures broadly. However, whenever appropriate, I include the expectations of a political economy version of realism, mercantilism or economic nationalism, which further emphasizes striving for national economic strength, independence in strategic industries, and industrial developmentalism especially in key strategic and defense industries as sources of state interests that guide policymaking.
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Interstate institutionalization has not been a key focus of realist analyses of world politics, and realists have questioned the relevance of international institutionalization for the most important questions in that realm. 53 International institutionalization, in general realist terms, means tools to further the preconfigured interests of the powerful states in the system. Alliances, for example, are temporary associations among atomized state-actors for specific instrumental purposes such as the balancing of power or threat. 54 Realists will not expect that such institutionalization would autonomously affect, modify, or reconstitute the interests of those states involved. The most important forces to shape French and German national interests, during the time period and geostrategic situation of this study's empirical inquiries, should be rooted primarily in the Cold War security context, implying truly existential threats to the physical survival of both countries. French and German security and armament policies should be formulated in response to it. In reverse, the structural rupture of however, neoliberal institutionalism does not imply specific views on the origins of national interests, which are exogenous to analysis and presumed as given or described in given political contexts. They may have a great variety of sources, including those stressed by realists; but they may also originate in domestic politics, domestic construction, or elsewhere.
International institutions thus perform functions that are beneficial for states with preconfigured interests. They allow states to overcome coordination problems and provide fora for repeated interaction. "Rationalist theories of institutions view institutions as affecting patterns of costs. Specifically, institutions reduce certain forms of uncertainty and alter transaction costs: that is, the costs of specifying and enforcing the contracts that underlie exchange. Even in the absence of hierarchical authority institutions provide information (through monitoring) and stabilize expectations. (1.) "The conduct of states or of militarily independent political units, even if one assumes them rational, does not refer to a single objective. To say that states act on the basis of their national interest is to say nothing, as long as one has not defined the content of that interest." Aron 1983, 454-455.
(2.) "However, the more sharply the significance of a cultural phenomenon is to be brought to cognizance, the more imperative the desire becomes to operate with unambiguous concepts that are not only particularistically, but generally defined. (5.) Cohabitation denotes a governmental configuration in which the president on the one hand and prime minister and ministers on the other are from different political camps. The Fifth Republic's political system permits this constellation, and, since the mid-1980s, electoral results intermittently have produced it.
(6.) For a more extended discussion of the historical significance of the Franco-German regularized intergovernmentalism and its political implications, see Krotz 2010, especially 168-177.
(7.) de Murville, 1983, 1, 12.
(8.) For a more extensive discussion of "predominantly symbolic acts and practices" in world politics, see Krotz 2002a. 
